## EXHIBIT 1

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
2	EASTERN DIVISION
3	TANYA N. SVOBODA, )
4	Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
5	situated,
6	Plaintiff, {
7	-vs- Case No. 21 C 5336
8	AMAZON.COM, INC., and () AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, () Chicago, Illinois
9	AMAZON.COM´SERVIĆES, LLC, ) Chicago, Illinois ) April 28, 2022 Defendants. ) 9:15 a.m.
10	por oridaries. ) of rolating
11	TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY FEINERMAN
12	DEFORE THE HOROTO DEE OF WELL THE WAY
13	APPEARANCES:
14	For the Plaintiff: KEOGH LAW, LTD. BY: MR. THEODORE H. KUYPER
15	(via telephone 55 West Monroe Street conference call) Suite 3300
16	Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 726-1092
17	(6.2)
18	For the Defendants: MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP BY: MR. GREGORY T. FOUTS
19	(via telephone 110 North Wacker Drive conference call) Suite 2800
20	Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 324-1000
21	Court Reporter:
22	CHARLES R. ZANDI, CSR, RPR, FCRR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
24	219 South Dearborn Street, Room 2144-G Chicago, Illinois 60604
25	Telephone: (312) 435-5387 email: Charles_zandi@ilnd.uscourts.gov

(Proceedings heard in open court:) THE CLERK: 21 CV 5336, Svoboda versus Amazon.com, Inc. THE COURT: For the plaintiff? MR. KUYPER: Good morning, your Honor. This is Theodore Kuyper on behalf of the plaintiff. THE COURT: For the defendant? MR. FOUTS: Good morning, your Honor. Greg Fouts on behalf of Amazon. THE COURT: Good morning. This is a case that, as

THE COURT: Good morning. This is a case that, as you all know, was initially on Judge Lee's calendar, and Judge Lee referred discovery supervision to Magistrate Judge Cole. And then the case was reassigned to my calendar earlier this month.

And there's a pending motion to dismiss; and there's already a discovery schedule in place for both fact discovery and expert discovery, and then there's a late May deadline for filing motions to amend the pleadings.

So, I wanted to get together and discuss the motion to dismiss. So, the defendant was last heard in writing, so let me ask the plaintiff, if there's anything in the reply brief that you'd like to orally address or any other points you'd like to make or emphasize, I wanted to give you a chance to do that.

MR. KUYPER: There's nothing specifically in the

reply brief that we would like to address, your Honor. Just generally, as you know, it's a BIPA class action about virtual try-on applications or programs that are on Amazon's website and their smart phone app, and they simulate what consumers would look like wearing makeup and other products such as sunglasses.

And the virtual try-on programs require consumers to upload a photo or use a video of themselves. And plaintiff claims that the programs scan the consumer's facial geometry and create a map or a face template of it, which is how the programs know where on the consumer's face to overlay the digital image of whatever product is being tried on.

THE COURT: Right. I understand all of that.

Anything further you'd like to add?

MR. KUYPER: Not specifically, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

Amazon, anything -- any points that you'd like to make or emphasize?

MR. FOUTS: Thank you, your Honor. Greg Fouts for Amazon.

I think the point that we want to emphasize, your Honor, you know, this is a 12(b)(6) motion that we've essentially said that the allegations of a BIPA violation aren't plausibly pled.

I think the way we characterized it in our brief was

you have here a photograph, a camera, and a computer, which is sort of Point A, and then you have a BIPA violation, which is sort of Point C; but there's really not, you know, a bridge between those points, I guess a Point B, if I can extend my sort of clunky metaphor.

The way that this works as a matter of fact, and I realize we're still on a pleading motion, but there's an allegation that there's been biometric information stored, or collected and stored. And, you know, the plaintiff says, I think, only in the complaint that there's a database where this is stored. There's no facts at all around this alleged storage.

As a matter fact, this is all done within the user's computer or within the cellphone app, so nothing actually comes to Amazon.

So, those are some of the points that we made in our brief, and we want to -- I just wanted to emphasize those this morning.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KUYPER: Your Honor, if I may respond to that.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. KUYPER: One thing I'd like to emphasize is the distinction here between the claims we allege and the subsection of BIPA that deals with storage.

We allege a 15(a) violation, which has to do with

possession. We allege a 15(b) violation, which has to do with the failure to obtain informed consent. This idea of storage, while it's alleged, it's not a prerequisite to either of the claims. It's subsection 15(e) that deals with storage.

And so this is just a distinction I want to make very clear because even if Amazon doesn't store the data itself, that has no impact on the 15(a) or 15(b) claims.

MR. FOUTS: And if I --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. FOUTS: If I could briefly respond to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. FOUTS: I apologize. I think the word "storage" I used, what I really meant was possession or receipt. So, those are 15(a) and 15(b) words.

In any event, the point -- the overall point is the same, which is that Amazon never comes into possession of this data.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss, and I -- it's not terribly complicated, so I'm just going to give my reasons on the record.

You know, the defendant argues that the complaint doesn't plausibly allege that Amazon possesses or collects biometric information, which is that facial geometry or

landmark data.

And I get the point, and it's kind of a feature of *Twombly* because *Twombly* says if you're a plaintiff in a complaint, you can't just mimic or repeat the elements of a cause of action. And that -- you know, that's an easy directive for a judge to apply in a case where, for example, the statute says -- or the common law doctrine says the defendant can't act negligently or recklessly in some way. And let's just say the complaint just says, "The defendant acted negligently," or, "The defendant acted recklessly," and doesn't add anything else. I think in that situation, there's a good *Twombly* argument that there isn't enough meat on the bones and you're just reciting the elements of the cause of action.

But there are other cases, and in my view, this one is among them, where the statute or the common law doctrine -- of course, here, we have a statute -- articulates a specific action. And here, it's the possession or the collection, and if you want, the storage, it doesn't really matter, of biometric information.

And so in a case like this where the complaint alleges that the defendant possessed or collected particular information, it's not really a good argument for the defendant to say, "Well, you're just mimicking the elements of the cause of action," because what else -- what else could the plaintiff

say at that -- at this juncture, at this early juncture?

And, you know, and even if that understates *Twombly* to a certain extent, I think here, given the complaint's description of this technology and what it does and how it operates, it's certainly plausible that when this -- in the process of this technology operating and a user deploying the technology, this virtual try-on technology, that the biometrics would go to Amazon's system and Amazon would possess -- would collect the information, would possess the information and, whether on a short-term or a long-term basis, would store the information, although again, storage -- acknowledging that storage is not a necessary component of either the 15(a) or the 15(b) causes of action.

So, for those reasons, I think that there is a cause of action pleaded under -- appropriately pleaded under *Twombly* and *Iqbal* for 15(a) and 15(b).

There's also the argument that the defendant makes that the 15(a) claim is not ripe because it doesn't allege that -- either that the initial purpose of obtaining the biometrics has been satisfied or that there's three years since the last interaction with the entity.

I think -- as an initial matter, I think that argument misconceives the 15(a) duty. The 15(a) duty doesn't kick in -- meaning the duty to have a schedule and then comply

with it, doesn't kick in only after three years or after the initial purpose expires, whichever is sooner. I think you have that obligation at the outset.

But even putting that to the side and accepting the defendant's legal premise, the initial purpose would plausibly end when a virtual makeup try-on session ends. And so even on that understanding, the claim is ripe because we do have the end of that -- we have the triggering of the 15(a) obligation when the virtual makeup try-on session ends.

And so I'll stop there, but -- in terms of the 12(b)(6) analysis, but I want to mention that the defendant's argument is really more of a 56 -- a Rule 56 argument than a 12(b)(6) argument. And I understand the defendant's frustration in that respect because the defendant looks at the complaint and Amazon looks at the complaint and says, "Look, this just isn't the way things work. We never take possession or control, and we never collect this biometric information. It stays on the user's device," and so on and so forth.

But that's a Rule 56 issue. And it may even be a Rule 12-minus-1 issue, assuming that the safe harbor requirements have been satisfied. But it's not a 12(b)(6) issue because a 12(b)(6) just requires the Court to look at the complaint and see whether there is sufficient allegations, sufficient factual allegations that are plausible in

themselves and that plausibly give rise to a cause of action under the legal doctrines that are set forth, that are articulated. And the complaint does just that.

So, I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss. You're in discovery supervision with Magistrate Judge Cole, so I don't want to step on his toes.

So, let me set a status hearing, Claire, for October 18th of 2022, which is going to be after the close of fact discovery, which is in late September.

And I know that in the status report Amazon said that it was going to be filing a summary judgment motion perhaps in the near future. And you certainly can do that, especially if you think that you have the facts to show that this technology does not work in the way that the defendant -- that the plaintiff says that it works, in that you can show that it's undisputed that Amazon never possesses or collects that face geometry and the other biometric information.

So, having raised that, let me ask the defendant, do you plan on filing a summary judgment motion at any point in the near future?

MR. FOUTS: Thank you, your Honor. Greg Fouts for Amazon.

I guess it depends on how you define the near future. We are not in a position, I think, imminently to file an early summary judgment motion, but we are certainly sort of

targeting that as a goal.

So, I can't give you a prospective date for that, but I think it would be certainly during the discovery period or before the close of the discovery period as it was set by Judge Lee.

THE COURT: Got it. All right. That's fine. So, I'll just keep that October 18th status.

Plaintiff, anything further from you?

MR. KUYPER: Not specifically, your Honor. I mean generally, given the state of discovery and the fact that we're getting stonewalled, you know, we think a summary judgment motion would be premature; but since counsel says it's not imminent, I'm not sure that's an issue that we really need to dive into today.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further from Amazon? MR. FOUTS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thanks to you both, and we'll get back together in October. And obviously, if anybody files a motion that is for -- on my side of the house rather than Magistrate Judge Cole's, just file the motion. I'll bring you in. If either side would like a status hearing with me at any time before October, just give the courtroom deputy a call, and we'll bring you in as soon as we're able to do so. Okay?

Be well.

1	MR. KUYPER: Thank you, your Honor.
2	MR. FOUTS: Thank you, your Honor.
3	THE COURT: We'll get back together in October.
4	MR. KUYPER: Thank you. Bye.
5	(Which were all the proceedings heard.)
6	CERTIFICATE
7	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
8	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
9	
10	/s/Charles R. Zandi May 5, 2022
11	Charles R. Zandi Date Official Court Reporter
12	official coult Reporter
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	